A wife obtained a domestic violence protective order in Alexandria (VA) Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court against her husband based on his aggressive behavior and threat to kill her (a threat made credible, in part, by her husband’s prior combat experience in the Navy). The order included a bolded, all caps warning stating that “while this protective order is in effect, you may be subject to a federal penalty under the 1994 amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), for possessing, transporting, or receiving a firearm.” Here’s what happened next:
Just over one hour after the court issued the order and an officer served it on [the husband], [he] entered the Sharpshooters firearms retail store and small arms range in Lorton, Virginia. There, [he] paid for a monthly membership, rented a Glock 22 handgun, and purchased two boxes of ammunition containing fifty rounds each. He proceeded to a firing lane for approximately thirty minutes of shooting, after which he returned the gun and left the range. Shortly thereafter, [the wife] contacted the police when she arrived home to find [the husband's] Sharpshooters membership card near the door inside her apartment.
The husband was convicted and sentenced on two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits possession by individuals subject to a domestic violence protective order. On appeal, the husband argued that his convictions violated the Second Amendment and that it was plain error to convict and sentence him on two separate counts for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Wilkinson, and joined by Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Mahin that the convictions did not violate the Second Amendment but that it was plain error to convict and sentence on two counts instead of one.
From the Second Amendment analysis:
[O]ur precedent indicates the district court is not required to speculate on a case-by-case basis what violent acts may have unfolded had the government failed to prosecute under § 922(g)(8). In Chapman we noted specifically that a conviction under § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii) is constitutional even if the statute’s “prohibitory net . . . may be somewhat over-inclusive” in reaching persons who would not misuse a firearm if permitted to possess one. Chapman, 2012 WL 11235, at *8. For intermediate scrutiny has never been held to require a perfect end-means fit. It is sufficient that § 922(g)(8) rests on an established link between domestic abuse, recidivism, and gun violence and applies to persons already individually adjudged in prior protective orders to pose a future threat of abuse. The obvious utility of Congress’ chosen means in advancing Congress’ indisputably important ends relieves trial courts of the need to ruminate in every case on what might have been if not for an indictment under § 922(g)(8).
From the plain error analysis and conclusion:
In United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998), we held that the defendant’s simultaneous possession of multiple firearms and ammunition supported only one count of conviction under § 922(g). Mahin’s indictment included two counts under §922(g)(8), one for the possession of a firearm and the other for the simultaneous possession of ammunition at the Sharpshooters firing range, which under Dunford constitutes only one violation. In light of Dunford, we agree with Mahin that the district court committed plain error in convicting and sentencing Mahin on both counts of the indictment. Because the court sentenced Mahin on each count and imposed a special assessment of $100 for each conviction, its rror affected Mahin’s substantial rights. We therefore affirm Mahin’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) as to count one, reverse his conviction as to count two for possession of ammunition while subject to a protective order, vacate his sentence, and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing in accordance with this decision.
