Posted in Fourth Circuit, Law, tagged advisory opinion, injury, Keenan, King, mootness, NEPA, ripeness, standing, Wilkinson on February 21, 2012 |
Last Friday, the Fourth Circuit dismissed as non-justiciable the appeal of a judgment in a challenge to potential improvements to specific sections of I-81. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion for the Court in Shenandoah Valley Network v. Capka, which was joined in by Judge King and Judge Keenan. The I-81 improvement project will take place in two tiers. This litigation arose at the end of Tier 1, before Tier 2 had run its course. The nub of the dispute was the extent to which decisions made at Tier 1 would foreclose consideration of alternatives at Tier 2. The court concluded that the appellants were mistaken about the extent of foreclosure at Tier 2. The court was satisfied that, once the parties’ positions were clear, there was no actual dispute giving rise to a case or controversy. Accordingly, dismissal was warranted: “Because such [an actual] dispute is lacking here–and because we cannot issue an advisory opinion–we have no authority to adjudicate this suit.” The court also cashed out its justiciability conclusion in standing terms: There was no injury or threat of imminent injury.
One interesting feature of the decision comes in a footnote at the end, in which the court notes that it would not order vacatur of the district court’s judgment: “The gist of the district court’s ruling is that the review process should be allowed to move beyond Tier 1 to Tier 2. Because vacatur is an equitable remedy, U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’Ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994), and because the balance of factors reveals no good reason to vacate the district court’s ruling, we decline to do so.” This reasoning, and the court’s careful phrasing of the justiciability problem (i.e., “there remains nothing to dispute” and “no justiciable controversy lingers”) suggests that the justiciability problem was not a pure standing issue, but some combination of mootness (of claims about Tier 1) and ripeness (of claims about Tier 2) .
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Posted in Law, tagged 5000A, ACA, Affordable Care Act, Article III, Ginsburg, healthcare, healthcare reform, justiciability, mootness, standing on January 7, 2012 |
In the previous post, I asked whether a member of an Indian tribe has standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the minimum coverage provision in § 5000A of the tax code (aka the “individual mandate in Obamacare”). A member of an Indian tribe is in an unusual position under § 5000A. She is obligated to have minimum essential coverage, but she is exempt from the penalty for non-compliance. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(3). Assuming that the penalty for non-compliance is the only legal consequence for not having minimum essential coverage, I do not see how she would have standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the requirement that she have minimum essential coverage.
If that is right, then what about Mary Brown? She is one of the private plaintiffs in the constitutional challenge to § 5000A to be decided by the Supreme Court. Ms. Brown’s lawyers have notified the Supreme Court that she has filed a petition for bankruptcy. Although there is not enough public information to make a conclusive determination, Ms. Brown’s financial situation probably qualifies her for a penalty exemption in § 5000A(e). If Ms. Brown does fall within one of the penalty exemptions, are there any arguments to support her standing that differ from those available to the member of an Indian tribe?
One that comes to mind is that financial circumstances are subject to change, whereas tribe membership is stable throughout one’s life. If a person’s qualification for exemption varies from month to month, then that person comes in and out of the legal crosshairs of someone with whom one can have a justiciable controversy. This difference is relevant, because someone permanently exempt has no legal adversity with anyone that would give rise to a justiciable controversy. The sometimes-exempt person, by contrast, sometimes does have such legal adversity.
The justiciability problem posed by a sometimes-exempt person is best thought of as a mootness problem rather than a standing problem. The general rule is that standing is assessed as of the time of filing. If the sometimes-exempt person was not exempt as of the time of filing, and the person otherwise had standing, then a change giving rise to that person’s exemption presents a problem of mootness. That doctrine is more flexible than standing. In Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), for example, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court expressed openness to an “argument from sunk costs.”
That is as far as I’ve taken the analysis for now. As always, I welcome suggestions, corrections, and other comments.
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