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Posts Tagged ‘Ginsburg’

In the previous post, I asked whether a member of an Indian tribe has standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the minimum coverage provision in § 5000A of the tax code (aka the “individual mandate in Obamacare”). A member of an Indian tribe is in an unusual position under § 5000A. She is obligated to have minimum essential coverage, but she is exempt from the penalty for non-compliance. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(3). Assuming that the penalty for non-compliance is the only legal consequence for not having minimum essential coverage, I do not see how she would have standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the requirement that she have minimum essential coverage.

If that is right, then what about Mary Brown? She is one of the private plaintiffs in the constitutional challenge to § 5000A to be decided by the Supreme Court. Ms. Brown’s lawyers have notified the Supreme Court that she has filed a petition for bankruptcy. Although there is not enough public information to make a conclusive determination, Ms. Brown’s financial situation probably qualifies her for a penalty exemption in § 5000A(e). If Ms. Brown does fall within one of the penalty exemptions, are there any arguments to support her standing that differ from those available to the member of an Indian tribe?

One that comes to mind is that financial circumstances are subject to change, whereas tribe membership is stable throughout one’s life. If a person’s qualification for exemption varies from month to month, then that person comes in and out of the legal crosshairs of someone with whom one can have a justiciable controversy. This difference is relevant, because someone permanently exempt has no legal adversity with anyone that would give rise to a justiciable controversy. The sometimes-exempt person, by contrast, sometimes does have such legal adversity.

The justiciability problem posed by a sometimes-exempt person is best thought of as a mootness problem rather than a standing problem. The general rule is that standing is assessed as of the time of filing. If the sometimes-exempt person was not exempt as of the time of filing, and the person otherwise had standing, then a change giving rise to that person’s exemption presents a problem of mootness. That doctrine is more flexible than standing. In Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), for example, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court expressed openness to an “argument from sunk costs.”

That is as far as I’ve taken the analysis for now. As always, I welcome suggestions, corrections, and other comments.

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The Supreme Court heard oral argument last week in First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards. The case calls on the Supreme Court to address the relationship between Article III standing and federal causes of action for statutory damages. The Federalist Society recently posted my post-argument podcast on the case.

I don’t have a confident prediction about how the Supreme Court will decide the case. But with four Justices virtually certain to find standing (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the challenge for petitioners is to gain the votes of all of the remaining five Justices. (In this sense, the case is like the upcoming health care cases, and many others.)

The decision will depend on whether all five Justices that petitioners need are persuaded that the interest protected by the statute is sufficiently distinct from the interests protected by well-established causes of action that do not require the plaintiff to show consequential harm.

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